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Abstract 
The use of franchises to deliver rail services has raised major problems. Franchises restrict 
competition in the market, whilst competition for the market through bidding for franchises 
has also met with difficulties, notably in relation to risk transfer and the recent use of short-
term contracts that have not been awarded competitively. Further, franchise agreements are 
detailed and highly stipulative and so do not achieve the flexibility and opportunities for 
innovation originally intended. This reflects an underlying lack of trust resulting from the 
arrangements adopted on privatisation. By contrast, in Sweden regional services have been 
procured through contracts with limited risk transfer, and in Italy provision of services has 
been entrusted to a dominant operator with comparatively limited detailed service 
specifications; both seem to have been more successful. For the future in the UK, possibilities 
include greater use of competition, a return to public ownership, regionalisation, and the use 
of concessions with limited risk transfer to secure stability.   
Introduction 
The use of contracts has now become not only a central means for the delivery of public 
services but has at last attracted the academic attention it deserves.2 However, there has been 
limited discussion in the legal literature of one field of such contracting which has both a high 
                                                 
2 See eg Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) Ch. 13: Peter Vincent-
Jones, The New Public Contracting: Regulation, Responsiveness, Relationality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); and A.C.L. Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), esp. ch. 3. 
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public profile and has proved highly controversial; that of the franchising of rail services.3  
Another theme has been rather neglected in the UK debates; that of comparison with the legal 
regimes of Continental Europe, which have well-established legal instruments for the 
delegation of the performance of public service tasks through concessions and other 
contractual devices. The aim of this article is to fill both these gaps by assessing the use of 
rail franchises in the UK and comparing it to the use of contractual tools in two other 
European nations. In this way we hope both to contribute to current debates on the future of 
franchising and to reflect on franchising as a mode of regulation. 
Rail franchises: their origins and purposes 
Rail franchises were an integral part of the fragmentation and privatisation of the British 
railway system under the Railways Act 1993. The idea had come from a number of sources, 
notably the Adam Smith Institute, when it was proving difficult to develop workable schemes 
for the introduction of private capital into British Rail.4 The provision of the rail 
infrastructure was to be separated from the operation of services; operators would compete 
for the right to provide such services, in some but not all cases for the same traffic flows.  
The 1992 White Paper, New Opportunities for the Railways, which set out the privatisation 
plans, described the role of franchises in nine paragraphs, stating that there would be no 
standard template for them nor any standard duration. Franchises would be awarded through 
an open competition by a Franchising Authority on the Government’s behalf and would 
specify obligations such as minimum frequencies and the quality of service in a franchise 
                                                 
3 For exceptions to this neglect see Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration 3rd ed., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 402-13: Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts 20-
23. 
4 See Terry Gourvish, British Rail 1974-97: From Integration to Privatisation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 368-9; Kenneth Irvine, The Right Lines (London: Adam Smith Institute, 1987). 
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agreement. Where possible, franchises would be designed to provide scope for competition 
between competing services from different franchise holders.5 No attempt appears to have 
been made to examine in any depth the nature of these contracts nor experience in other 
nations where, as we shall see, there was already extensive use of contracts for the provision 
of rail services. 
 What is franchising for?6 The franchise holders (the train operating companies or ‘TOCs’), 
despite being the public face of the railway, have a surprisingly restricted role; they do not 
typically own their own rolling stock (normally leased from specialist leasing companies) nor 
the track, signalling nor major stations.  Our answer to this question would be to suggest that 
franchising performs two linked purposes. The first is that of bundling commercially 
profitable services with the unprofitable ones required for public service reasons, so requiring 
franchise holders to provide both. The role of the franchise here is to ensure that the public 
service requirements are met. The inevitable result is that there are severe restrictions on 
competition within the franchise area; as we shall see below, contrary to the plans in the 
White Paper, TOCs are given near-exclusive rights. Competition is for the award of the 
franchise (which may include profitable opportunities), not generally in the direct provision 
of the service to consumers. The second purpose is to provide specification of the required 
services necessary to meet a public service demand. Franchises thus offers an alternative to 
other means of ensuring that public services are provided in a way which meets social as well 
                                                 
5 Secretary of State for Transport, New Opportunities for the Railways: the Privatisation of British Rail, Cm 
2012, (1992), paras 25-33. 
6 This has become known in railway circles as the ‘Christian Wolmar’ question, named after the distinguished 
rail journalist who has repeatedly posed it: See e.g. Christian Wolmar, RSA Speech: What is franchising not 
for?, December 12, 2014, available at: http://www.christianwolmar.co.uk/2014/12/rsa-speech-what-is-
franchising-not-for/ (consulted 12 June 2017). 
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as competitive goals, for example the use of universal service funds for which competing 
companies can bid to provide socially necessary services at the lowest cost. If this is the most 
plausible understanding of the role of rail franchising, it raises issues which are at the heart of 
the current debates concerning contractual governance. In particular, it raises the issue of 
trust in relation to the provision of public services.   
The use of franchises is a response to a lack of trust in the ability of the privatised operators 
to maximise returns for shareholders whilst at the same time maintaining public service 
provision. This lack of trust was exacerbated by the model adopted for privatisation, in which 
the formerly unitary British Rail was split into a large number of separate companies linked 
by contract. The use of franchises thus represents regulation designed to ensure that at least 
some form of trust can be maintained after privatisation and fragmentation of the rail 
industry. As Baldwin, Cave and Lodge have pointed out, one objective may be to ‘avoid the 
restrictiveness associated with classical command and control regulation while, nevertheless, 
enabling some degree of control to be retained.’ It also permits competition for the market 
rather than within the market, thereby maintaining the benefits of competitive pressure.7 
As we shall discuss, control may be exercised in a number of ways in a rail franchise. A 
principal means is through detailed specifications for the service. The expectation would be 
that effective monitoring of the operator’s performance in meeting specifications would 
engender trust between the contracting parties; over time, increasing trust in the operator’s 
ability to meet expectations would correspondingly reduce the necessity to continue to 
prescribe or strictly enforce the precise content of specifications and other terms in the 
contract in future. There is of course a vast literature in the study of contract relating to trust, 
                                                 
7 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2012), 166. 
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from Durkheim onwards; one summary which is particularly apposite here comes from Hugh 
Collins: 
The … effect of trust between the parties is that it reduces the need to guard against 
disappointment by specifying in detail the precise content of the reciprocal 
undertakings and then monitoring performance closely. In the presence of trust, it will 
be assumed that the intention to minimize disappointment will lead the other to fulfil 
reasonable expectations without the need to supply particulars of every aspect of those 
expectations and then check upon compliance with the terms of the contract. In other 
words, the transaction costs of contractual specificity and monitoring can be reduced 
by the presence of trust … In short, trust functions as an antidote to transaction costs.8 
If it was envisaged that franchising would ensure trust for the public through government 
oversight and trust between contracting parties through performance monitoring leading to a 
reduction in contractual specificity and transaction costs, the experience of rail franchising 
has not engendered such levels of trust, compromising contractual governance and the 
achievement of regulatory goals. As we shall discuss, trust leading to flexibility in the 
contract has been undermined by a tendency to specify in extreme detail the normative 
requirements applying to the delivery of rail services, a problem which has bedevilled rail 
franchises. Further, lack of effective performance monitoring from the outset in order to 
increase trust and reduce excessive monitoring over time has been a major issue exacerbating 
misplaced levels of control throughout the franchise duration; for example, through 
threatening regimes of penalties and termination which have, themselves, been largely 
ineffective. As a result, one of the great merits claimed for franchising as a regulatory 
strategy, namely flexibility and adaptability to the specific circumstances of its operation over 
                                                 
8 Regulating Contracts (1999), 100-101; see also 3, 98-102, 110-4, 129. 
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time, has instead manifested characteristics of that often mythical beast, ‘command and 
control regulation’ rather than permitting the service provider to judge changing market 
conditions and to innovate.9 
‘Command and control’ regulation has come under massive criticism in recent years 
suggesting that ‘smarter’ forms of regulation which involve a more reflexive set of relations 
between regulator and regulatee have major advantages.10 As we shall discuss below, having 
identified the objectives of franchising, we have to ask whether franchising in its current form 
is always the ‘smartest’ way of achieving them. Regulation theory has identified franchises as 
having certain characteristics which offer an effective regulatory strategy provided they do 
not come to resemble certain less successful forms of command and control. However, it may 
be questioned whether the circumstances surrounding rail provision such as privatisation, 
competition for the market and detailed contractual forms could have rendered franchising 
effective across the spectrum of rail services provided. By contrast, there has been virtually 
no consideration of the potential and characteristics of other modes of regulation which 
could, in fact, be more responsive to public service demands. As we shall discuss, 
concessions can provide more appropriate specifications and risk allocation and which 
respond to regional needs, conditions which may be more conducive to fostering greater trust.  
These contracts do not avoid all of the problems of command and control regulation but 
recent experience suggests that they are worthy of detailed consideration as a regulatory 
strategy. At the very least, they reveal that the traditional franchise is not the only mode of 
regulation being deployed; there are important variations that must be examined. 
The fostering of trust in regulatory relationships is also a major task for a procedural public 
law, especially where, as in the case of rail, there are complex regulatory relationships 
                                                 
9 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 192. 
10 This huge literature is summarised in Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, esp. chs 7-8, 11-12. 
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between multiple actors.11 This is applicable to franchising just as it is to any other mode of 
regulation; ‘franchising authorities should be expected to be as accountable as any other 
regulatory bodies … and the processes whereby the terms of franchises are set and enforced 
should be designed to be as transparent, accessible, and fair as other regulatory 
mechanisms.’12 These legitimacy questions have posed serious difficulties in relation to other 
areas of contractual governance.13 As we shall see below, the record of UK rail franchising is 
decidedly mixed in this regard; the overseas systems we shall study also have major problems 
of transparency, but may in part compensate for these through other factors which enhance 
trust. 
The relevant law 
Although the award of franchises is complex and rail franchise agreements highly detailed 
and stipulative, the Railways Act 1993 which forms the basis for rail franchising is singularly 
lacking in detail. S.23 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to designate from time to time 
passenger services to be subject to franchises but the choice of services for designation is left 
to the minister’s discretion; discretionary exemptions may also be made to such designation. 
                                                 
11 Tony Prosser et al., ‘Neo-Institutionalist and Collaborative-Relational Approaches to Governance in Services 
of General Interest: the Case of Energy in the UK and Germany’, in De Schutter and Lenoble, Reflexive 
Governance (2010), 67-95, 83, 90-4.  For the role of trust in complex regulatory regimes see Frédérique Six and 
Koen Verhoest, ‘Trust in Regulatory Regimes: Scoping the Field’ in Six and Verhoest, eds, Trust in Regulatory 
Regimes (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017), esp. at 9-14. For the role of contracts (and, in particular trust) as a 
complement to other regulation in network industries, see Jon Stern, ‘Regulation and Contracts for Utility 
Services: Substitutes or Complements? Lessons from UK Railway and Electricity History’ (2010) 6(4) The 
Journal of Policy Reform 193-215, esp.196-200. 
12 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 192. 
13 See eg Collins, Regulating Contracts ch. 13; Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts ch. 3, 
Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting, ch. 12. 
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UK public sector bodies are prohibited from bidding, though this has not prevented public 
enterprises from other European countries obtaining a substantial number of UK franchises.14 
S.26 of the Act empowers the minister to select franchise holders from those who submit 
tenders but does not require a competitive tendering process. The key decisions are very 
much left to the minister rather than being subject to detailed legal provisions and clear legal 
constraints. However, the minister is required under amendments made by the Railways Act 
2005 to issue a statement of policy on the exercise of his powers in relation to tendering.15 
This states that it is likely that a tendering process will be used, except where this is not 
practicable because of potential disruption of services, or where tendering would not be 
conducive to the effective administration of a sustainable and well-resourced programme of 
franchise competition, or to the fulfilment of government objectives in relation to rail 
transport.16 In these circumstances a direct award will be made; as we shall see below, direct 
awards have been made extensively in recent years. 
Most UK public contracting has been transformed by the EU public procurement rules.17 
Historically, the provision of rail passenger services was considered to be exempt from the 
procurement directives. However, in practice franchises were typically awarded under the 
Public Contracts Regulations 2006 as ‘Part B Services’ but with no clear procedural rules for 
their award.19 To clarify the legal position, the 2014 Public Sector Directive and Concessions 
                                                 
14 S. 25. 
15 Railways Act 1993 s. 26(4A); Department for Transport, Statement of Policy on the Exercise of the Secretary 
of State’s Power under Section 26(1) of the Railways Act 1993 (2013). 
16 Ibid, paras.9-11. 
17 See e.g. Tony Prosser, The Economic Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 9. 
19 It is arguable that ‘rail transport services’ may have constituted a ‘Part B’ service (a classification which no 
longer applies under Directive 2014/24/EU) under the then UK Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (PCR 2006) 
and which were advertised in the Official Journal of the EU as such. Alternatively, it is arguable that rail 
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Directive have now excluded rail contracts from their scope.20 Such contracts are now 
principally governed by the Public Services Obligation Regulation 1370/2007.21 This 
provides that exclusive rights and/or compensation must be allocated through the use of 
public service contracts, with a maximum of 15 years duration (this can be extended where 
there are special investment needs). Award may be by competitive tender, although direct 
awards are also permitted; in addition emergency measures may be used to deal with risks of 
disruption.22 The Fourth Railway Package proposed by the European Commission and now 
enacted, originally proposed ending the ability to make direct awards.23 Quite apart from the 
uncertainty created by Brexit, however, this has been considerably watered down by the 
Council through the inclusion of wide exceptions permitting direct awards, including where 
justified by the structure and geographical characteristics of the market and network and if it 
                                                                                                                                                        
franchises may constitute a ‘service concession contract’ meaning a public services contract under which the 
consideration given by the contracting authority consists of or includes the right to exploit the service(s) to be 
provided. However, the PCR 2006 did not generally apply to a services concession contract (Reg.2 and 
6(2)(m)). To this extent, it appeared that, at most, a limited number of provisions applied, in particular general 
EU law principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination; see Case C-48/03 Parking Brizen 
GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen [2005] ECR I-8585. 
20 See Directive 2014/24/EU Public Procurement Directive [2014] OJ L94/65 as implemented in The Public 
Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/102 (Article 10(i); Reg.10(1)(i)) and The Concession Contracts 
Regulations 2016 and Directive 2014/23/EU Concessions Directive [2014] OJ L94/1 2014 as implemented in 
The Concession Contract Regulations 2016, SI 2016/273 (Article 10(3); Reg. 10(3)(b)). 
21 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007, [2007] OJ 
L315/1. 
22 Articles 3-5. 
23 Communication from the Commission … on The Fourth Railway Package – Completing the Single European 
Railway Area to Foster European Competitiveness and Growth, COM(2013) 25 Final, 30.1.2013, 7. 
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would improve the quality of services or cost-efficiency.24  The legal basis for rail franchising 
thus continues to impose only a patchwork of limited procedural restrictions on the powers of 
the Secretary of State in the award of franchises. 
The performance of rail franchising 
Despite daily media reports to the contrary, passenger rail services have clearly had some 
major successes in recent years with passenger numbers increasing by 60% over the past ten 
years, and journeys rising from 600 million in the mid-1980s to over 1.6 billion journeys in 
2014-15.25 This may in part be attributable to marketing and service improvement by the 
franchise holders, although the reasons for the increase are highly complex and include 
changes in the national economy and in lifestyles.26 However, the franchising process has 
encountered serious problems.  First it will be necessary to examine the relationship between 
franchising and competition. 
Franchising and competition 
It is, of course, in the very nature of franchising that it restricts competition in the provision 
of services to consumers through providing near-exclusive rights to the provision of services 
in the area covered. In the UK, so-called ‘open-access competition’ in passenger services, 
which gives another company the right to run selected services in the area covered by the 
franchise holder, is extremely limited; thus there are currently only two open access operators 
and their services represent less than 1% of passenger miles, though in May 2016 consent 
                                                 
24 Regulation (EU) 2016/2338 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 December 2016, OJ L354/22, 
art. 1. 
25 Competition and Markets Authority, Competition in Passenger Rail Transport Services in Great Britain: A 
Policy Document (2016), para. 1.1. 
26 Social Research Associates, On the Move: Exploring Attitudes to Road and Rail Travel in Britain (London: 
Independent Transport Commission, 2015). 
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was granted for further open access services on the East Coast main line, in this case to a 
different franchise-holder to the incumbent.27 The limit to competition is due both to the 
restricted capacity for new services on potentially profitable routes, and a reluctance to allow 
‘cream skimming’ through competing only for the most profitable services thereby 
threatening the revenues of franchise holders, deterring potential bidders and reducing 
income for government.28 The Competition and Markets Authority has put forward ambitious 
recommendations to increase competition either with franchise holders or through replacing 
franchises with a licensing system for some main lines; we shall return to these later when we 
consider alternatives to franchises.29 In addition, competition between overlapping and 
parallel franchises is very limited as a consequence of the reduction of the number of 
franchises from twenty-five to fifteen. The near-exclusive nature of franchises may thus be 
presented as limiting the increases in efficiency and in consumer choice which would be the 
outcome of more open competition in the provision of passenger rail services. 
Franchises do, of course, appear to offer a different form of competition; competition for the 
market rather than competition in the market.30 However, the history of passenger rail 
franchising shows considerable difficulties in the process for achieving this. First, the 
institutional arrangements for franchising have been changed several times and there has been 
a striking lack of stability in franchising policy, reflecting not only problems of the 
performance of franchise holders but inadequacies in the contractual management capacity 
and performance of the Department for Transport. Thus, after franchising was introduced by 
                                                 
27 See Competition and Markets Authority, Competition in Passenger Rail Transport Services…, para. 1.23. 
28 Competition and Markets Authority, Competition in Passenger Rail Transport Services…, para 1.24. 
29 Competition and Markets Authority, Competition in Passenger Rail Services in Great Britain…. 
30 For an account of franchises as a means of such competition see Baldwin et al, Understanding Regulation, 
165-94. 
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the 1993 Railways Act, there were 25 franchises for (normally) seven years. Awards were 
initially made by a Franchising Director closely linked to the Department for Transport.  
However, under the Transport Act 2000 the process passed to the arm’s length Strategic Rail 
Authority, which in turn was abolished under the Railways Act 2005. Awards are now made 
by the Passenger Services Directorate within the Department’s Rail Executive; there are now 
only 15 franchises.   
The Coalition Government envisioned franchises of fifteen years or more to facilitate 
investment through increased stability. However, very serious problems emerged with the 
aborted renewal of the InterCity West Coast franchise in 2012. Here, after the 
commencement of judicial review proceedings by the incumbent operator, material came to 
light showing serious impropriety and inefficiency in the Department’s decision-making 
process; this was caused both by poor financial modelling in relation to risk transfer 
considered necessary for longer term contracts, and inequality of treatment of bidders, 
including in the communication of information to them. As a result of these revelations the 
award had to be withdrawn, other franchising suspended and a new award made.31 The 
resulting Brown Review of franchising recommended a more cautious approach of shorter 
initial franchises with the possibility of extensions and intermediate break points. It also 
recommended revised arrangements for risk sharing between operating companies and the 
                                                 
31 For details of these events see House of Commons Transport Committee, ‘Cancellation of the InterCity West 
Coast Franchise Competition, HC 537, 2012-13 and the official inquiry into the events; ‘Report of the Laidlaw 
Inquiry’, HC 809 (2012-13).  
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Department.32 The franchising process re-commenced with the adoption of these 
arrangements.33 
However, two competition-related problems remain. The first is that, partly due to the 
disruption of the franchise re-letting programme after the InterCity West Coast fiasco and 
disruptive infrastructure improvement work, a profusion of short direct awards, normally 
lasting for two-three years, has replaced the longer franchises in many cases. These do not 
result from a process of competitive tendering but from direct negotiation with the incumbent 
bidder. Following the collapse of the InterCity West Coast award process in 2012, direct 
awards were used for ten of the next fifteen awards, and such contracts were in place for a 
third of all franchises in 2017.34  Though intended to be a temporary measure, the use of short 
direct awards thus represents a major change of substance to the nature of franchising. As we 
shall see in a moment, some direct awards also involve a major difference in the allocation of 
risk, taking the form of management contracts in which risk of financial loss is borne by the 
Department, not the TOC. 
Moreover, it seems that the number of bidders for franchises is limited. The major operators 
in the past have been large transport groups such as FirstGroup, Virgin or Stagecoach, or 
subsidiaries of public-owned railways of other European countries, most notably Arriva, 
owned by Deutsche Bahn and most recently Trenitalia. The prohibition on public bidders for 
franchises in the Railways Act 1993 does not apply to foreign-owned enterprises, and around 
half of franchises are either run by subsidiaries of public sector operators abroad or have 
substantial involvement by them; uncertainty over Brexit does not seem to be a deterrent. An 
                                                 
32 Department for Transport, The Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme, Cm 8256 (2013). 
33 Department for Transport, Government Response to the Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme, 
Cm 8678 (2013). 
34 Transport Committee, ‘Rail Franchising’, HC 66, 2016-17, para. 19. 
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emerging problem is that it has been difficult to attract new bidders; since the 
recommencement of the franchising programme in 2013 three bids were received for each of 
the first five franchises, this representing the minimum considered by the Department to 
create competitive tension and to increase the likelihood of receiving high quality bids. The 
limited number of bidders has been characterised by the Public Accounts Committee as a real 
risk to value for money.35  Only two bidders entered the competition for the South West and 
West Midlands Franchises to be allocated in 2017. This reluctance to enter the market reflects 
in part the fact that it now costs over £10 million to prepare a bid, and the figure was close to 
£15 million in the case of InterCity West Coast.36 It is also likely due to uncertainty in 
government policy which could create further market instability and increase costs should the 
Government implement the proposals of the Competition and Markets Authority referred to 
above. Thus competition for services is almost non-existent, whilst competition for franchises 
is now also limited. 
Specification of service requirements and financial arrangements 
The service requirements for franchise holders are set out in an astonishing level of detail.  
For example, the 2016 rail franchise agreement for Northern Rail has a basic service level 
commitment running to 275 pages including specifications such as ‘One service from 
Sheffield [to Wakefield] shall be provided departing between 1000 and 1030 and shall 
provide a through journey to Carlisle.’37 Indeed, the major difficulty in identifying relevant 
information is the sheer volume and complexity of the documents; the Northern Rail 
agreement runs to no less than 609 pages, supplemented by a further seven schedules setting 
out train service requirements, totalling 450 pages. At the point of privatisation, it was 
                                                 
35 ‘Reform of the Rail Franchising Programme’, HC 600, 2015-16, Conclusion 2 and paras 8-14. 
36 Roger Ford, ‘What Next for the Passenger Railway’, Modern Railways, July 2016, 24-31, 25. 
37 Department for Transport, Northern Rail 2016: Rail Franchise Agreement (2016). 
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expected that the Franchising Director would prescribe service specifications to a degree 
appropriate to the level of competition, for example, with detailed specifications where the 
operator was a near monopolist to substitute for market pressure but only service 
specifications necessary to ensure good value for money where there was market pressure.38 
Yet, for many years, detailed service specifications appear to have been applied across all 
franchises, irrespective of levels of competition achieved.  
Financial details are also complex; for example, the Intercity East Coast Franchise helpfully 
tells us that ‘The Franchise Payment for any Reporting Period shall be an amount equal to: 
3FP = PFP + TAA + SCA + GDPA + GDPR1 + GDPR2 + TUA + CPS + TMDPS…’.  These 
values are defined, but the actual amounts are redacted.39 Such complexity has the dual effect 
of amounting to a serious constraint on the ability of operators to innovate and meet changing 
need (a far more intrusive constraint than ever applied to British Rail before privatisation) 
and undermining transparency by making it very difficult to work out what the financial 
requirements actually are.  
The allocation of risk 
A major problem associated with the management of franchises as part of the wider rail 
industry has been that of the allocation of risk. Whilst operators’ costs are relatively fixed, 
there is the issue of who bears risk regarding revenues and operator performance. The key 
point is that risk may be endogenous (reflecting the performance of the operating company, 
for example a decline in passenger numbers due to poor quality services) and exogenous 
(outside the control of the company, most importantly reflecting the performance of the 
                                                 
38 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 176 citing Secretary of State for Transport, Guidance to the Franchising Director 
(London 1994). 
39 Franchise Agreement – InterCity East Coast (Department for Transport, 2014), sch. 8.1. 
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national economy to which passenger numbers, especially on commuting routes, are closely 
aligned). A variety of different techniques have been adopted to allocate risk; for example, 
the use of ‘cap and collar’ arrangements by which operators received revenue support 
payments from the Department to compensate them for losses caused by exogenous 
influences. The InterCity West Coast fiasco concerned precisely the issue of risk, with the 
main problems relating to flawed modelling and bias in the setting of subordinated loan 
facilities for bidders designed to reduce the risk of their default. However, financial aspects of 
risk are never clearly defined in franchises. Whilst there may be an issue concerning over-
specification of service levels which hamper innovation, financial aspects of risk should 
always be clearly specified (within the bounds of confidentiality). 
The consequences of poor risk management are seen in instances of contract termination and 
renegotiation. For example, in 2003 the Connex South East franchise was terminated after a 
shortfall had been covered up because of a failure to reach cost reduction targets. In 2006 a 
financial crisis in the parent company led to the premature end of the East Coast franchise, 
and the successor operator surrendered the franchise prematurely once more in 2009, services 
being operated successfully by a public sector operator of last resort until it was refranchised 
in 2015. In 2011 First Great Western indicated that it wished to take advantage of a 
contractual break clause to terminate its franchise early after substantial losses due to a 
decline in passenger numbers; it continues to operate the franchise under a renegotiated direct 
award with most revenue risk borne by the government.40 The use of mechanisms such as 
break clauses to justify the case for contract renegotiation or a direct award in order to 
recalibrate risk is unlikely to instil trust and undermines the importance of consistent 
performance monitoring and risk assessment as an incentive to improved future performance. 
                                                 
40 For an assessment of these events see Andrew Bowman et al, The Great Train Robbery: Rail Privatisation 
and After (Manchester: Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change, 2013), ch. 5. 
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It brings into question how accurate the assumptions underpinning risk allocation were at the 
outset as well as whether risk can be effectively managed in the long-term business relation; 
it appears that such mechanisms have been used to deal with generally foreseeable issues 
rather than exceptionally unforeseeable events beyond the control of the contracting parties. 
The Brown Report on the future of franchising recommended that revised risk sharing 
arrangements be adopted with the Government retaining elements of exogenous revenue 
risks, for example those related to fluctuations in GDP, and this has been the approach 
adopted in more recent franchises. Management contracts with the Department bearing such 
risks have also been adopted for some direct awards where disruption is caused by 
infrastructure work; this is most notably the case for the Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR) 
management contract covering Southern services, the largest of all franchises. This has not 
been successful; the GTR contract has been plagued by disruption caused by a combination 
of major infrastructure work and industrial action. It has been suggested that the management 
contract limits the incentives on the operator to settle disputes, although the contact also 
contains a system of penalties which could be used by the government, a point to which we 
shall return below.  Overall, the Transport Committee has concluded that, in rail franchising 
in general, although ‘[t]he transfer of financial risk to the private sector was a central 
premise of rail franchising, … historically there has been a relatively low level of 
financial risk from operating a passenger rail franchise.’  However, risk for the private 
operator may now be increasing due to falling profit margins and the increasing size and 
complexity of franchises.41  
A different approach has been adopted for areas of urban railway, the London Overground, 
Crossrail and Merseyrail, in the form of a concession. The use of this term ‘concession’ does 
                                                 
41 Transport Committee, ‘Rail Franchising’, para. 52 (emphasis retained). 
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not directly correspond to the concept of a franchise nor to the term as used under EU law 
and in continental Europe. An order is made by the Secretary of State to exempt the service 
from the franchising requirement in s.23 of the Railways Act 1993. Instead a transport 
authority enters into a concession agreement with a service provider (concessionaire) to 
provide the services. A key difference between a UK concession and traditional franchises 
and the concession under EU law is that under the concession, there is no transfer of risk. The 
revenue risk is borne by the public authority issuing the contract, Transport for London and 
Merseyrail, and these public bodies set fares. In principle, the service specification is to be 
more detailed than that in a franchise agreement, but in practice, as noted above, franchises in 
fact contain much greater specification of the details of the services required than was 
originally intended, thus reducing the formal difference between the two types of contract. 
The use of concessions so far seems to have worked reasonably well, and we shall return to 
the subject when we discuss alternatives to franchising below.  
 Fragmentation 
A further very important problem of franchising is fragmentation of the rail industry; this 
differentiates the UK model of rail privatisation from that adopted in other nations. 
Fragmentation has created problems of management coordination between Network Rail and 
service operation, resulting in high costs in the form of increased fares and lack of public 
support.42 Thus the McNulty Report commissioned by the Department into value for money 
in GB rail found that: 
[h]aving multiple industry players, together with misaligned incentives and the 
existing railway culture, has made it difficult to secure co-operative effort at 
operational interfaces, or active industry engagement in cross-industry activities…  
                                                 
42 ‘Rail Franchising’, ch. 6. 
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These effects of fragmentation are exacerbated by misaligned planning and budgeting 
cycles between the various players and by having, in effect, two separate regulators – 
in the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) and the Department for Transport (DfT).  The 
DfT’s role in this respect is largely the enforcement of franchise obligations and fares 
regulation.43 
One example of the serious effects of such a lack of coordination is the failure to manage a 
coordinated response when engineering works overrun.44 There have been several initiatives 
adopted to try to deal with the deficiencies of coordination through the development of 
alliances between different actors, including franchise holders. The most developed of these 
was the ‘Deep Alliance’ between Network Rail and South West Trains. Although both 
companies retained a separate identity, they were effectively merged for management 
purposes through the establishment of a single organisation with its own executive and 
governance board. However, after three years the alliance was ended in this form, partly 
because of problems of predicting Network Rail costs but mainly because the Department 
had decided not to make a direct award at the end of the South West Trains franchise but to 
seek competitive bids for a new franchise. Nevertheless, there may be a continuing role for 
such alliances after a recent ministerial announcement that some form of alliancing would be 
required for new franchises, and a small new project would integrate infrastructure and 
operations on one route.45 The Shaw Report on the future of Network Rail proposed a major 
devolution within Network Rail from the national level to that of regional routes, and a much 
                                                 
43 Department for Transport 2011, Realising the Potential of GB Rail: Report of the Value for Money Study (the 
McNulty Report), (Department for Transport 2011), para. 4.1. 
44 See e.g. Office of Rail Regulation, Investigation Report: Disruption Caused by Engineering Overruns on 27 
and 28 December 2014 at King’s Cross and Paddington Stations (ORR, 2015). 
45 Secretary of State for Transport, ‘Rail Reform: Future of the Rail Network’, HLWS321, 6 December 2016. 
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closer focus on customer needs, especially those of train operating companies. 46 This would 
also facilitate adoption of some form of alliance, but there are severe limits to the potential of 
alliances in other areas, not least because they are not suitable where there are multiple 
operators on a Network Rail route.47 This issue of how best to minimise the effects of 
fragmentation is likely to be a major concern in the development of future institutional and 
regulatory policy relating to rail, and we shall return to it in our recommendations for reform. 
Transparency and the franchising process 
It thus appears that there have been serious difficulties in balancing competition and 
flexibility for train operators with regulation to maintain rail’s role as a nationwide public 
service. It will be recalled that the burgeoning literature on the use of contractual modes of 
governance in the UK has had as one of its major themes the requirement that contracts for 
public services are also responsive in the sense of complying with public law norms of 
transparency. This would involve some element of public input in the drawing up of the 
contracts, especially if they are seen as a means of implementing public interest norms which 
may be highly contestable. It would also imply that, unlike in the case of ordinary private law 
contracts, the maximum possible amount of information is made publicly available, including 
the content of the contracts themselves subject only to deletions for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality where absolutely necessary. Finally, it would imply that there is a means of 
monitoring the operation of the contracts which is accessible to interests other than merely 
the two parties to the contract. It should be emphasised that this is different from the question 
of whether or not contracts should be awarded by competitive tendering. Such tendering may 
be an important means of achieving pro-competition goals and value for money and may also 
                                                 
46 Department for Transport, The Future Shape and Financing of Network Rail: The Recommendations (the 
Shaw Report), (Department for Transport, 2016). 
47 Transport Committee, ‘Rail Franchising’, para. 88. 
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help to comply with public law norms, but tendering still concentrates on the formation of 
what are ultimately bilateral relationships between contracting parties. Rail franchising 
involves broader public interest and public service considerations, and a wide range of 
different interested parties, including of course passengers, funders and different territorial 
levels of government. 
Rail franchising is more transparent than the previous arrangements under British Rail. Costs 
were often opaque, the compensation under the Public Service Obligation introduced by the 
Railways Act 1974 was not broken down in any detail and did not refer to particular groups 
of services but rather acted as a top-down cash limit, and the internal relations within a 
unified enterprise (albeit one with marked internal divisions) were not publicly set out or 
structured.48  
Invitations to tender for new franchise awards are published on the Department’s website, 
accompanied by a press release. A guide to the franchise process has been published setting 
out the procedures which the Department will follow in making awards.49 However, the lack 
of transparency in the conduct of tendering processes is evidenced by the InterCity West 
Coast process and was heavily criticised in the official report into what had gone wrong.50 
The subsequent Brown review of franchising recommended that an overt and direct 
weighting be given to quality factors with greater transparency.51  
                                                 
48 For these general problems of nationalised industries see Tony Prosser, Nationalised Industries and Public 
Control: Legal, Constitutional and Political Issues (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) and for the British Rail 
Public Service Obligation see Gourvish, British Rail 1974-97, 147-9. 
49 Department for Transport: Passenger Services Franchise Competition Guide (2016). 
50 ‘Report of the Laidlaw Inquiry’, paras 3.2-3. 
51 Paras 5.24, 5.30. 
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In terms of devising specifications for the franchise to be tendered, in the case of the 2015 
process for the award of the Greater Anglia franchise for example, a three-month consultation 
was undertaken via use of the Department’s website and the distribution of leaflets at 
stations; five consultation events were held in local towns. The consultation attracted over 
1300 responses, and a detailed overview document was published.52 However, the 
consultation questions were relatively narrow, concerning possible individual changes to the 
current services, and once more the Transport Committee was highly critical.53 By contrast, 
the Welsh Government (to which franchising will be fully devolved from 2017) adopted a 
much more wide-ranging and bottom-up approach to developing the specification for the 
Wales and Borders franchise. It engaged in strategic consultation well before issuing its 
specification, including asking consultees to identify relevant quality characteristics. This 
resulted in high-level policy priorities to be used as the basis for competitive dialogue with 
bidders.54 This goes beyond fostering trust between the franchisor and franchisee; it renders 
more explicit the responsibility of both contracting parties to the public, having placed their 
trust in both parties to meet expectations. It is also more reflexive; as has been suggested in a 
different public service context: 
                                                 
52 Department for Transport, Delivering Transformation and Growth for Passengers East Anglia Rail Franchise 
Stakeholder Briefing Document and Consultation Response (2015), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481392/east-anglia-stakeholder-
briefing.pdf (consulted 12 June 2017). 
53 ‘Rail Franchising’, paras 93-6. 
54 Welsh Government, Setting the Direction for Wales and the Borders Rail (2016), available at: 
http://www.fsb.org.uk/docs/default-source/fsb-org-uk/walesandborders.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (consulted 12 June 2017); 
Welsh Government Policy Priorities for Wales and Borders Rail Services and Metro Operator and Development 
Partner Procurement (2017), available at: http://gov.wales/docs/det/publications/170301-policy-priorities-
en.pdf (consulted 12 June 2017). 
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government policy should pay specific attention to the social learning dimension of 
governance in public service sectors … as distinct from more familiar issues of 
efficiency, legitimacy and accountability. Such recognition might lead to a better 
understanding of the relationship between the economic and democratic strategies … 
and of the need to avoid undermining the basic collaborative and relational conditions 
of effective social learning.55 
In addition to problems of transparency in the franchise procurement process, the Transport 
Committee has also pointed to a lack of information after the franchise award. Redacted 
versions of the rail franchises are published and much other information is available on a 
Department for Transport website.56  The previous concession for London Overground was 
published, as is that for Crossrail and Merseyrail. Detailed financial information is, however, 
excluded; it was noted above that the complex financial provisions of the agreements are not 
accompanied by the amount of money involved, which is redacted for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality. Some information on the financial performance of operators can nevertheless 
be extracted from the Office of Rail and Road’s statistical database.57 The franchise 
agreements contain a standard set of detailed conditions on confidentiality and freedom of 
information. This makes information supplied by each party confidential, subject to 
exceptions. The latter include, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, information relating 
to performance measurement and information required from the Secretary under the Freedom 
                                                 
55 Peter Vincent-Jones and Caroline Mullen, ‘From Collaborative to Genetic Governance: The Example of 
healthcare Services in England’ in Oliver De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble, Reflexive Governance: Redefining 
the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 147-78, 176 (emphasis retained). 
56 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/rail-franchising (consulted 12 June 2017). 
57 See e.g. Office of Rail and Road, Rail Finance: 2014-15 Annual Statistical Release (2015). 
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of Information Act. In the latter case disclosure is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, 
who will also decide on the application of exemptions.58   
Management of the franchise is also subject, of course, to scrutiny by the National Audit 
Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the Transport Committee, but this has not always 
been straightforward. The most striking example of difficulties is the 2016 dispute about 
extensive train cancellations under the GTR contract. Here it was simply not clear what the 
role of the government was in determining whether there had been a breach of contractual 
terms and any remedial steps necessary to address ongoing performance, both of central 
importance in seeking resolution of the dispute. Civil servants repeatedly failed to clarify to 
the Transport Committee the nature of the Department’s involvement.59 A subsequent 
exchange of letters between the junior minister involved and the Chair of the Committee 
noted that the latter was ‘appalled’ at the responses which were ‘unacceptably opaque and 
failed to answer any of these questions adequately.’60 In a subsequent report, the Committee 
concluded that ‘despite the Department’s consistent claims of a commitment to transparency, 
our experience would suggest that transparency in franchising monitoring appears to be very 
poor.’61  There is thus some transparency in the sense of public availability of information 
about franchises, but very limited transparency in relations between government and 
franchise holder after the franchise has been awarded, including both monitoring and changes 
to the contract. 
                                                 
58 See e.g. Franchise Agreement – InterCity East Coast sch. 17. 
59 See Transport Committee, ‘Improving the Rail Passenger Experience' HC 64 (2016-17), paras 58-75 and oral 
evidence qs 316-65.  
60 Transport Committee, ‘Letter from the Chair to Paul Maynard MP…’, 23 August 2016. 
61 ‘Rail Franchising’, para. 115 (emphasis retained). 
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The above discussion suggests that rail franchising has met with a two-fold failure as a means 
of responsive contractual government.  It has not succeeded in providing a form of regulation 
which offers flexibility and scope for innovation for operators, nor has it met the goals of 
increased transparency. Have other systems elsewhere performed better in meeting these 
objectives? 
Overseas experience 
In the UK there has been very little use of experience elsewhere as a guide to developing a 
system which combines a degree of competition for the market with the protection of public 
service objectives. However, this has been the practice for many years in other European 
systems. The first example is that of Sweden, which split its rail network into a number of 
different enterprises even before the UK did so. The second is that of Italy which has a long 
history of the use of contractual instruments to protect public service goals. It is, of course, 
necessary to employ international comparative work with caution and some of the major 
characteristics of the other systems described cannot be duplicated in the UK. As we shall 
discuss, examples are the incremental approach to liberalisation adopted in Sweden and the 
role of constitutional provisions as a basis for public service norms (and a public service 
culture) in Italy.  However, it is still possible to draw lessons from the overseas experience 
described here. 
Sweden 
The Swedish railway was split in 1988 into two parts; the National Rail Administration, 
Banverket, was responsible for the infrastructure and was retained in public ownership as a 
government agency and Statens Järnvägar (SJ) was a separate body responsible for running 
railway services. The planning and subsidy of regional services was delegated to regional 
transport authorities and they were given the power (though not the duty) to procure them 
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through competitive tendering. As early as 1989 a regional contract was awarded to a private 
company; by 2008 there were nine passenger operators. More recently, inter-regional services 
have also been opened up to competitive tendering, in this case responsibility for the 
tendering lying with the infrastructure authority.62 
Despite the apparent similarities with the UK, there are important differences. The Swedish 
network is substantial, but, given the lower population and the relatively small size of 
Swedish cities, congestion is much less than in the UK, with an intensity of track-usage 
below the European average.63 Whilst there might appear to be scope for open-access 
competition, the liberalisation of rail has instead been characterised by the use of competitive 
tendering for unprofitable services, competition for the market rather than in the market, 
although, since 2010 the market for profitable services has been opened to competition 
through open access. 
The reasons for the break-up of the Swedish system were also very different from those in the 
UK. The latter was the culmination of a radical programme of privatisation of public 
enterprises and contained a strong ideological theme, including a belief that open markets 
would benefit consumers. By contrast, that in Sweden has been characterised as an 
‘unintentional deregulation’; ‘the chain of events should be seen as moves to protect an ailing 
                                                 
62 For a summary see Chris Nash, ‘What Does a Best Practice Network Look Like?’ in Matthias Finger and 
Pierre Messulam, eds., Rail Economics, Policy and Regulation in Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 
232-47, 240-1.  For more detailed treatment see Jan-Eric Nilsson, Restructuring Sweden’s Railways: The 
Unintentional Deregulation (Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, 2003): Matthias Finger 
and Andrea Rosa, Governance of Competition in the Swiss and European Railway Sector (Florence: European 
University Institute, 2012), 84-98 and Gunnar Alexandersson and Staffan Hultén, Competitive Tendering of 
Railway Services in Sweden: Extent and Effects 1989-1999 at: http://www.thredbo-conference-
series.org/downloads/thredbo6_papers/thredbo6-theme1-Alexandersson-Hulten.pdf (consulted 10 June 2017).  
63 Nilsson, Restructuring Sweden’s Railways, 5-6. 
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industry and to hold the cost for procuring unprofitable railway services as low as possible.  
The use of deregulation to strengthen the consumer perspective has at most been of secondary 
importance.’64 This is reflected in the gradual process of liberalisation. 
There is also an important difference in the nature of the contracts used for the provision of 
rail services. In the case of regional services, gross-cost contracts are used by the regional 
authorities. These are similar to the concessions discussed above according to which 
authorities carry the risk, pay a specified sum to the operator to provide the services, set the 
fares and plan the services. The operators bid for the lowest amount of subsidy required to 
operate these services, although in some cases there are profit-sharing arrangements to 
stimulate performance and penalties are employed. The contracts are relatively short-term (3-
5 years with the possibility of a short extension), and planning is for the regional authorities; 
the latter also provide the rolling-stock through a jointly-owned leasing company so entry 
costs are low.65 Longer distance services are contracted out by the infrastructure company; in 
this case net-cost contracts are used with the bidder retaining passenger revenue and 
estimating any subsidy needed to cover the gap between costs and revenues, and unforeseen 
deficits cannot be refunded. Bidders have more freedom to shape the services, but they are 
fixed for the duration of the contract. Evaluation of bids includes a quality element, and there 
are performance-related payments. Contract duration has been as short as one year but is now 
normally from three to twelve years with an option for a short extension.66 
How successful has this system of competitive procurement been? It has been subject to some 
of the same problems as those in the UK; for example failure to perform by bidders, 
                                                 
64 Nilsson, Restructuring Sweden’s Railways, 4. 
65 Chris Nash, ‘What Does a Best Practice Network Look Like?’, 240, 245; Finger and Rosa, Governance of 
Competition in the Swiss and European Railway Sector, 90-91. 
66 Finger and Rosa, Governance of Competition in the Swiss and European Railway Sector, 91. 
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predatory behaviours by bidders, a scarcity of bidders and reduction in connecting services.67  
However, it does seem to have been more successful in reducing the cost to the public of the 
rail system; as mentioned above, this, rather than increased competition to benefit the 
consumer, was the major justification for the reforms of the Swedish rail system. Thus, whilst 
support from the state has grown in proportion to passenger traffic, this has been in the form 
of support for infrastructure investment rather than operating subsidies, and it has been 
suggested that the increased costs of vertical separation have been more than offset by the 
savings from competitive tendering.68 This is in marked contrast to the UK where the costs of 
the rail system have substantially increased since privatisation and fragmentation, and are 
now double in  real terms the levels of 1985-86.69 Indeed, Sweden was one of the comparator 
nations used in the benchmarking exercise carried out by the value for money study 
commissioned by the Department for Transport.  It found that GB rail costs would need to be 
reduced by around 40 percent to meet those of the comparators, and that there was a 
substantially higher taxpayer subsidy per passenger-kilometre in the UK.70 
There are two lessons to be drawn from the Swedish experience. The first is that of the 
central role of regional authorities in both the development of the service requirements and in 
tendering. The second is that there has been an extensive reliance on gross-cost contracts with 
risk retained by the public authority; further, at regional level there has not been any attempt 
at the complex risk sharing arrangements adopted in the UK. The Swedish experience is, 
                                                 
67 Finger and Rosa, Governance of Competition in the Swiss and European Railway Sector, 92. 
68 Chris Nash, ‘What Does a Best Practice Network Look Like?’, 240-1. 
69 Transport Committee, ‘Rail Franchising’, para. 44. 
70 Department for Transport 2011, Realising the Potential of GB Rail, 28-32.  The report notes that the subsidy 
figures should not be regarded as indicative because they can be affected by debt write-offs, the treatment of 
capital expenditure and other factors. 
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however, less transparent even than that of the UK; the contracts do not seem to be publicly 
available nor can we find evidence of open procedures in drawing them up. Indeed, an 
economic study of the types of contract used has complained of the limited amount of 
information available and the difficulties of obtaining it from some authorities, whilst a 
potential bidder for contracts has also complained that ‘[v]ery little detail of tender bids is 
published and with improved quality being such a key element of the evaluation criteria, it is 
difficult to be specific about the financial and other benefits that competitive tendering has 
delivered’.71  There is also no single central repository or standard template for the contracts.   
On balance, however, the Swedish arrangements have proved less problematic and have 
achieved greater legitimacy than those in the UK for three reasons: the extensive role of 
regional authorities; the limited degree of risk transfer (in contrast to franchises but 
comparable to concessions in the UK); and the successful reduction in costs through 
competitive tendering. 
Italy 
The Italian rail network is extensive, with a similar size to that of the UK. It has invested 
heavily in new high-speed lines linking Turin, Milan, Rome and Naples with high capacity, 
but there is also an extensive network of regional and local lines serving small populations 
and performing an important public service role.72 One radical difference from the UK is that 
                                                 
71 Jan-Eric Nilsson and Lina Johnsson, ‘Lessons from the Tendering of Railway Services in Sweden.  Are Some 
Contracts Better than Others?’, (2011) XXXVIII International Journal of Transport Economics, 71-90, 87-90: 
Arriva, Liberalisation and Competition in the European Regional Rail Market (2013), 31, available at: 
http://www.arriva.co.uk/~/media/Files/A/Arriva-Corporate-V2/press-release/2013/29-10-2013-2.pdf (consulted 
10 June 2017). 
72 For a brief overview of the Italian system in English see OECD, Policy Round Tables: Recent Developments 
in Rail Transportation Services 2013, 125-33. 
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constitutional provisions form the background to decisions on managing the rail network.  
Article 16 of the Constitution provides a right to reside and travel freely and this is treated as 
constituting a fundamental right to mobility which forms part of the relevant regulatory 
environment.73 This provides a firm basis for public service requirements. Article 41 provides 
the basis for a mixed economy with both private and public property, whilst Art. 43 permits 
the reservation to the state of an enterprise in the field of essential public services. 
In 1905 the enterprise Ferrovie dello Stato was established; in 1992 it was transformed into a 
company in which all shares were held by the state; plans to sell a 40 percent stake have not 
yet been implemented. In 1993 it was given a seventy-year concession to provide public 
transport services; this was reduced to 60 years in 2000 in a process which also provided for 
an internal organisational division between the management of infrastructure and the 
provision of services over it. Thus the holding company of Ferrovie dello Stato spa [FS] has 
as subsidiaries Rete Ferrovia Italiana spa [FSI] owning and managing the infrastructure and 
Trenitalia spa operating the services. This is, of course, not a fragmentation as seen in the UK 
but a differentiation of subsidiaries under an overall holding company, a model more 
commonly adopted in Continental Europe to comply with EU requirements for accounting 
separation. The infrastructure company operates under a sixty year concession conferring 
exclusive rights and is linked to the state through a programme contract for a minimum of 
three years setting out investment and state financing. The exclusive right to provide services 
was replaced by a system of licences to provide rail transport services, the first of which was 
given to Trenitalia.74 The minister is responsible for issuing such licences (which only 
                                                 
73 Giachetti Fantini, ‘La liberalizzazione del trasporto ferrovario: l’esperienza italiana nel contest europeo’, 
[2016] 5 Federalismi.it: Revista Di Diritto Pubblico Italiano, Comparato, Europeo 2-61, 58-9. 
74 Fantini, ‘La liberalizzazione del trasporto ferrovario’, 19-21. 
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concern technical issues regarding the right to operate) and the operator must also agree a 
concession with the infrastructure owner. 
The institutional structures for regulation in Italy are also highly complex, involving the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, the antitrust authorities and regional and local 
authorities.75 Since the beginning of 2014 an important actor has also been l’Autorità di 
regolazione dei trasporti [ART], a new independent regulatory commission which is 
responsible for regulating access to infrastructure, the service regime and passengers’ rights 
across all areas of transport.76 
Open access competition has been introduced for the high-speed lines and, after initial 
difficulties, is now a major feature of their operation. The first attempt at such access failed 
after strong opposition by FS.77  The second open-access operator, Nuovo Trasporto 
Viaggiatori (NTV), competes solely on the high-speed network and was more successful after 
the Italian antitrust authority had settled its case against the FS Group on terms requiring 
much more beneficial conditions for access than those originally proposed by the latter.78 
NTV engages in competition on price and especially on the basis of quality of service at the 
top end of the market through the purchase of a new fleet of trains and through quality 
                                                 
75 For an overview see Alessandro Candido, ‘La Governance Dei Trasporti in Italia: Soggetti, Livelli di 
Governo, Competenze’ in Laura Ammannati and Allegra Canepa, eds, La Politica in Europa: Verso Uno Spazio 
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76 For a summary in English see Carlo Cambini and Luisa Perrotti, ‘The New Transport Regulation Authority in 
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77 L’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, A436-Arenaways, provvedimento n. 23770, Bollettino 
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improvements and has achieved considerable success.79 Thus the Italian system has permitted 
much greater open access competition than the UK. 
Public service requirements are also an important part of the regulatory landscape in Italy, 
reflecting the constitutional norms referred to above. However, there is no agreed single 
definition of universal service in this context.80 This vagueness has been criticised by the 
antitrust authority as blurring the distinction between competitive and universal services and 
so making the introduction of competition more difficult.81 Definition of public service 
obligations is for the ministry and the regions, now in conjunction with the ART which is 
also responsible for issuing rules relating to quality standards such as ticketing, passenger 
information and treatment of delays. The ministry was required by a law of 2007 to conduct 
an investigation into the balance between costs and receipts of different services, but this has 
never been made public.82 The main responsibility for public service requirements lies with 
two levels of government. For long- and medium-distance services, these requirements are set 
out in law and in the public service contract between the state and Trenitalia.83 That applying 
up to 2016 was a document of 20 pages and is publicly available; it set out general 
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obligations for the company, which include the tariffs to be charged; financial penalties are 
also included for breach of the obligations. It did not, however, include the detailed service 
prescription characteristic of the UK franchises; services were based on the existing 
Trenitalia patterns. Similarly, the new ten-year contract from 2017 bases services on existing 
patterns but with requirements for quality improvements and investment.  In the case of 
regional services, the regions are required by law to approve three-yearly plans for services, 
which specify the network and the organisation of services, integration with other modes, the 
resources to be made available, tariffs and the arrangements for monitoring.  These are then 
implemented by means of contracts with operators, with a maximum duration of six years, 
renewable once, specifying service standards and tariff structures in detail.84  For example, 
the contract between the Lazio region, which includes Rome, and Trenitalia is forty-one 
pages long, and sets out the public service compensation to be paid, requirements for 
investment in specified types of rolling stock, tariffs to be charged and penalties for breach.  
Services are based on Trenitalia’s existing ones, though further documents may specify 
services required. Such documents are very brief compared to UK franchises; for example, 
the specification in the contract for Piemonte runs to only thirteen pages.85 In both national 
and regional contracts revenue risk is borne by the public authority; thus in the new Intercity 
contract, tariffs for public service provision and the compensation awarded to the operator are 
determined directly by the state with penalties and incentives based on operating 
performance. 
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In principle regional contracts were to be awarded by competitive tendering since 1999, but 
the legal position is complex and the requirement of such tendering has been eroded. Indeed, 
funding has often been made conditional on the services being provided by Trenitalia, the 
incumbent operator. This has been criticised by the antitrust authority but in 2012 a new law 
which required the adoption of competitive tendering for local services was held to be 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court as infringing the rights of regions, and so it 
remained possible to use direct procurement.86 Nevertheless, several regions have decided to 
proceed by competitive tendering.87 The ART has now been given the responsibility for 
defining the principles on which competitive tendering should be based, and issued a set of 
rules for this in 2015. This includes rules relating to the award procedure, for example on 
transparency and avoiding conflicts of interest, and rules relating to passenger service 
standards in order to achieve uniform standards throughout the regions; these latter also apply 
to directly-awarded contracts.88 
Transparency is limited. Most of the contracts are publicly available (though important 
annexes may not be) but there is no central repository or standard set of procedures for 
drawing them up. Ex ante scrutiny is very restricted. There is some consultation before 
regions develop their transport plans but these are only with a very limited number of 
organisations. The Lazio contract requires that its renewal should take place through a public 
procedure.89 However, the type of bottom-up consultation used by the Welsh Government as 
discussed above was described by our Italian collaborator as ‘science fiction for Italy’.  
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Instead, there is some use of legal challenges in the courts but only after decisions have been 
taken. These have generally been unsuccessful.90 
This complex picture raises a number of important issues which are relevant to the UK; once 
more, there is an apparent paradox between a system characterised by limited transparency 
but which appears to work reasonably smoothly avoiding the serious legitimacy problems in 
the UK. However as in Sweden, the regions have a major role in determining public service 
in Italian railways. This is part of a more recent trend towards regionalisation of the 
management and regulation of railways in Europe; thus a comparative study of the 
governance of competition in rail found that regionalisation was a major characteristic of all 
six countries studied, with the exception of the UK. It concluded that such regionalisation had 
produced satisfactory results.91 
The second key point is that there is a well-established system of contracts setting out public 
service requirements. These have been criticised for their vagueness, but they have avoided 
the highly complex and detailed specifications characteristic of UK franchise agreements.  
This is in part because of the availability of a single dominant operator with whom long-term 
relations can be built up. In addition, revenue risk is borne by the public authorities so there is 
no need for complex formulae to allocate risk. Together, these factors appear to have avoided 
the serious lack of trust so characteristic of the UK, especially given the rooting of public 
service norms in constitutional requirements. 
The future 
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The different cultures and background in Sweden and Italy might seem to make it very 
difficult to draw lessons for the UK. However, we would suggest that this overseas 
experience can feed into a number of possible scenarios for change in the provision of 
passenger rail services. 
More competition? 
One criticism of franchising is that it is anti-competitive as it severely restricts competition in 
the market place for the provision of rail services, and so it should be supplemented or 
replaced by the entry of competing providers. This is the view presented by the Competition 
and Markets Authority in its 2016 report on Competition in Passenger Rail Services.92 The 
Commission presents four possible options for increasing competition; they are, first, a 
significantly increased role for open access operators operating alongside the franchised 
companies; second, splitting franchises between two successful bidders; third, redrawing the 
franchise map to increase overlaps providing competition on particular traffic flows, and, 
fourth, replacing franchising with a licensing regime permitting multiple operators to serve 
the same routes. Its preferred options are the first and the fourth. Both would require major 
changes; for example, the first would require a substantial increase in track access charges for 
open access operators, who currently pay only the marginal costs of running their services 
without contributing to fixed infrastructure costs, and the funding of public service 
obligations through universal service levy or similar mechanism to avoid cream-skimming by 
new entrants.93 The fourth option would involve the requirement to provide socially 
necessary services through licence conditions, which themselves could be made tradeable.94 
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It is highly unlikely that these reforms will replace the franchising system. First, the report 
makes it clear that they are not appropriate for the whole of the rail network, but rather for the 
three main intercity routes: the East Coast Main Line, the West Coast Main Line and the 
Great Western routes, with the possible addition of the Midland Main Line. Some system 
such as franchising would need to be maintained for the rest of the network. Second, the 
heavily used nature of the UK rail network, particularly in the case of these lines, would be 
likely to cause capacity problems which would limit the scope for new entry. The Authority 
considers that this is solvable through improved incentives and new technology, but this 
remains untested. It is striking that in Italy open access has been used successfully only for 
the recently constructed high speed lines which have much higher capacity than the 
conventional network. In the UK HS2 would appear to be the most suitable candidate for 
such competition, but this is only referred to briefly by the Authority in view of uncertainties, 
for example the impact of open-access competition on the HS2 business case.95  The 
Department for Transport has now announced that HS2 will initially take the form of an 
integrated franchise with InterCity West Coast and there will be a single operator.96 Third, the 
Authority’s proposals will do nothing to minimise the problems of fragmentation of the 
railway system; indeed, they are likely to make it worse with a proliferation of different 
operators. Moreover, increased open access would also complicate even more the already 
highly-complex fares system which has been heavily criticised in passenger surveys.97 
Finally, whilst operators facing increased competition may be incentivised to better 
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performance, it is equally likely that even more regular and diverse competitions could also 
compromise the trust of existing operators that are used to competition but who believe in the 
core rationale of competition for the market, namely the limitation of the market to a 
community of trusted providers tasked with exercising exclusive rights. 
A return to public ownership? 
With the re-classification of Network Rail as a public body by the Office for National 
Statistics in 2014 and related changes to its borrowing arrangements, the core of the rail 
system is now in public ownership, and the Shaw Report on the future of Network Rail has 
made it clear that wholesale privatisation is not a current option.98 One possibility for the 
future would be to take this process further by taking the franchises back in to public hands as 
they expire, possibly using the model adopted temporarily for the East Coast main line 
franchise through use of a public sector operator. This is the policy of the opposition Labour 
party and the trade unions, and from polling evidence seems to have public support; it also 
has its academic advocates; further, as mentioned above, there is already extensive 
participation in the operation of services by publicly-owned overseas companies.99 It would 
permit administrative coordination of a unified rail network and could avoid the need for the 
use of formal contractual arrangements, although internal ‘administrative’ contracts would 
still be needed. It would resemble the use of such coordination in the last years of British 
Rail, when it was split into business sectors creating greater transparency within the overall 
enterprise.100  It would also be closer to the Italian model which, as we have seen, appears to 
have avoided many of the serious problems experienced in the UK. 
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However, it is unlikely that it will be possible to return to the old days of British Rail even if 
this were desirable. There are doubts as to the government’s capacity to undertake the task; 
the public sector operator of last resort was wound up in in 2015 and replaced by a public-
private partnership.101 Further, EU law also requires a much clearer identification of state aid 
for public service requirements than was the case with the old British Rail public service 
obligations. The EU Public Services Obligation Regulation provides that exclusive rights 
and/or compensation must be allocated through the use of public service contracts, with a 
maximum of fifteen years duration (this can be extended where there are special investment 
needs);102 however, the general principles of EU law require that public service compensation 
be clearly identified and costed in advance as a result of the Altmark case in 2003.103 As the 
experience of other European countries shows, this in no way precludes public ownership, 
and of course the future effect of EU provisions in the UK is uncertain after Brexit; however, 
any publicly owned system would still most likely be dependent on the use of contracts to 
show the transparent use of public funds (as in the Italian case). This may be highly desirable 
on accountability grounds but limits the possibility of simple reliance on administrative 
coordination. In any event, any return to public ownership would still need to address the 
concerns raised in this article, and we shall now suggest how this could be done either with 
such ownership or with the retention of private operators. 
Regionalisation and concessions? 
There is another future possibility which will retain the use of contractual relations but in a 
rather different form through the devolution of the rail network with greater involvement of 
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local government. Already, the national governments in Scotland and Wales play a major role 
in the rail franchising process. An unexpected development since the 2015 election has been 
the rapid movement towards the creation of city regions under the Cities and Local 
Government Devolution Act 2016, effectively a regional tier of government, and also a move 
towards larger administrative entities outside the cities. These are most advanced in the north 
of England, where in March 2015 management of two franchises was delegated to Rail 
North, a consortium of local authorities acting in partnership with the Department; these will 
become part of the Transport for the North partnership when the latter gains statutory 
recognition under the Act. As noted above, this reflects a more general trend in European rail 
towards greater regionalisation; in both Sweden and Italy regional authorities play a major 
role in tendering and in the setting of public service requirements. It also fits with other 
trends in the organisation of the railways; the Shaw report on the future of Network Rail 
recommended large-scale devolution to routes which would broadly reflect regional 
structures, and the possibility of such devolution was also supported in the Brown report. 
In the regions, the possibility of open access competition is limited, as regional and commuter 
services predominate, and are excluded from the recommendations of the Competition and 
Markets Authority discussed above. They also require particularly strong public service 
requirements and monitoring, whilst the opportunities for innovation by operating companies 
are relatively limited. Thus the most appropriate model would seem to be that of a concession 
of the sort already used for London and Merseyside, with revenue risk carried by the public 
authority, which also sets fares. This could be combined with the development of deep 
alliances with routes of a devolved Network Rail (as envisaged in the Department’s 
December 2016 announcement referred to above), the use of concessions avoiding many 
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uncertainties associated with franchising. Such a solution has been strongly advocated by 
Transport for London based on its own experience of using concessions.104  
The counter example is that of the GTR referred to briefly above. Though formally a 
franchise, this is characterised as a management contract. In reality, it is more like a UK 
concession in that a fee is paid to GTR to cover its operating costs and a small operating 
margin with revenue risk borne by the Department rather than the operator; however, unlike 
London and Merseyside, this contract is managed centrally rather than through locally 
accountable transport authorities. In the context of a serious industrial dispute resulting in the 
wholesale cancellation of trains, a common criticism has been that there has been little 
incentive on the company to improve performance notwithstanding an apparent incentive 
regime to meet quality standards on customer experience and performance benchmarks.  
However, as noted above, the problem seems less to do with the allocation of risk and more 
to do with a failure to monitor performance properly, to apply remedial measures to rectify 
performance, to design adequate penalty systems and to the unwillingness of government, 
which supports the company in the dispute, to trigger and enforce them.105 Regionalisation 
could also create the risk of horizontal fragmentation, but this would be much less disruptive 
than the current vertical fragmentation between infrastructure owner and train operator. 
This leaves the inter-city services which would not be appropriate for regionalisation. There 
are several possibilities here. One is to increase significantly the opportunities for 
competition, as proposed by the Competition and Markets Authority report discussed above, 
though we are doubtful whether this would work for the reasons set out earlier. Another 
would be to retain the system of franchising for them. A third would be to replace franchises 
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with concessions, potentially awarded to public or private bodies, thus moving closer to the 
arrangements in the other European countries we have discussed and avoiding the absurdity 
of permitting public enterprises from outside the UK to bid whilst prohibiting UK-based ones 
from doing so.  Such a role for concessions was considered and rejected by the Brown report 
on grounds that this would require a body other than the franchise holder to be able to market 
and sell tickets and that leaving the revenue risk with the franchisee has provided powerful 
incentives to grow revenue and patronage.106 However, we have seen a move towards short-
term franchises with limited revenue risk for operators anyway in recent years, and the 
detailed specification of franchise terms means that recent franchises are in practice not that 
different from concessions. This model might also provide a means of avoiding the serious 
problems of risk allocation experienced in the past. It corresponds with what we have found 
in our overseas comparisons; a similar set of proposals has also been made recently by Roger 
Ford, a leading UK railway journalist.  He concludes that ‘the franchising experiment has run 
its course’, partly because it does not reward long-term commitment to investment and 
improvement of services and partly because of the vagaries of risk transfer. Stability favours 
instead management contracts or concessions with the risk retained by government, 
negotiated as extensions to existing franchises where they have been competently run.107 
Such a model would also permit the development of longer concessions, with break points 
(used for periodic monitoring, not for recalibrating risk), providing a more stable framework 
for operators. Again, longer-term contracts may lead to greater trust between the contracting 
parties over time as contracts become more like collaborative partnerships. Interestingly, in 
the West Coast partnership franchise for the initial services on HS2 and for those on the West 
Coast Main Line, once HS2 services are launched, revenue and operating costs will not be 
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transferred to the franchise holder and instead there will be a performance-based management 
contract with incentive mechanisms.108 
Conclusion 
Due to a rail privatisation perceived as threatening uneconomic but socially-desirable 
services, and the continued unpopularity (and often low quality service) of the privatised 
operators, the UK rail environment has been characterised by extremely low trust. Flexible 
use of franchise contracts which gives operators space for responsiveness and innovation has 
simply not proved possible. Instead there has been a crude form of regulation characterised 
by the highly complex and over-prescriptive franchise agreements, coupled with ambiguity 
on the centrally important issue of risk transfer. Such attempts as there have been to build 
trust by increased transparency have not succeeded, especially as transparency in relation to 
the operation and monitoring of the contracts is very restricted, as is shown strongly by the 
GTR fiasco. By contrast, it was made clear to us that in Italy the existence of an established 
dominant operator created relationships which were characterised by a higher degree of trust, 
something also reinforced by a strong public service tradition and indirectly by underlying 
constitutional norms.109 This is what explains the different forms of governance of public 
service in rail transport in the two nations. In Sweden the major role for the regions and a 
different approach to risk, in which revenue risk is borne by regional authorities, also seems 
to have produced a much more stable system. These successes result notwithstanding less 
transparency than in the UK. 
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The changes we have proposed on the basis of study of other systems, in particular 
regionalisation, the assumption of greater risk by public authorities and a more stable set of 
concessions, may provide a means by which the UK system can move away from highly 
detailed and prescriptive, low-trust norms towards a more collaborative and responsive mode 
of governance for our rail services over time. The usual argument deployed against this is that 
our proposed changes would restrict opportunities for innovation and a flexible response to 
changing customer demand by operators.110 However, in the UK the opportunities for 
innovation and flexibility have always been limited. At the point of privatisation it was 
considered necessary for franchises to be stipulative to compensate for lack of trust and 
uncertainty in market pressure; whilst better performance monitoring over the years should 
have engendered trust and reduced prescription, the trend towards over-stipulation continues 
without flexibility or innovation. Uncertainty in franchising policy and recurring issues with 
existing franchises suggest that, whilst there remains a need for control in the continuing 
absence of trust, concession-style agreements may continue to offer that control but in the 
form of more adaptable contractual techniques that are better equipped to deal with economic 
and other uncertainty and the prevalence of devolution in all its forms. 
More clearly defined allocations of risk, more broadly informed specifications and well-
planned systems of performance monitoring, may shift the balance away from what has been 
characteristic of rail franchises, namely misplaced exercises of public control through 
excessively specified contracts on issues of quality and over-reliance on the threat of 
penalties as a poor substitute for effective contract management. Concessions may do more 
than create stability and incentivise compliance with a contract in the short term. Concessions 
may lead contracting parties to think about contracts for rail services as opportunities for the 
development of long-term business relations that look beyond short-termism to strategic 
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partnerships for the longer-term. The latter may even lead to innovation of the kind 
franchising has failed to provide. As Collins has observed: ‘reliable assurance of quality in 
performance depends ultimately not on contract terms but on trust and non-legal sanctions. 
Relations of trust and powerful non-legal sanctions depend upon the establishment of long-
term business relations and the confinement of competition to a known and trusted 
“procurement community” of contractors.’111 It is evident both that reform is sorely needed to 
build trust and that study of other systems can contribute to it. 
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